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The issue of base erosion and profit shifting has been on the international policy agenda for 
several years now. The aim of this paper is to examine how firms adjust their profit shifting 
mechanisms in a changing institutional environment. In particular, we test whether firms 
substitute one profit shifting strategy for another if respective costs change. To this end, we 
exploit changes in the strictness of transfer pricing regulations and thin capitalization rules over 
time in a panel of European multinational firms and study a quasi-experimental reform setting 
in France. We confirm existing evidence that tightening transfer pricing regulations reduces the 
tax sensitivity of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) substantially. Our results show, 
however, that this reduction includes both a reduction in profit shifting activity via the transfer 
pricing channel and a substitution with debt shifting. Moreover, firms using debt shifting to 
begin with rely more heavily on tax optimization of transfer prices when thin capitalization 
rules are strengthened. If transfer pricing regulations are also strict, the conditional reform 
effects show that the substitutive response is more pronounced for a subsample of firms with a 
high share of intangible property (IP). The difference-in-difference approach for the French tax 
reform illustrates an increase in profit shifting based on transfer prices for treated firms facing 
new restrictions on debt shifting. Again, the effect is stronger for IP intensive firms.  
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1 Introduction 
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) is a phenomenon the existence of which has been 
illustrated by case study evidence and archival studies using broad financial or administrative 
datasets. In particular, the cases of large companies such as Google, Apple, Amazon, Starbucks 
and others engaging in tax avoidance schemes as well as the enormous amounts of estimated 
foregone revenue have gained huge media attention and led to a remarkable upheaval in tax 
policy. Several unilateral countermeasures were implemented at the national level, while action 
plans such as the OECD/G20 BEPS Report (OECD, 2015) and the EU Corporate Taxation 
Action Plan (EU Commission, 2015) were launched to encourage coordination in the fight 
against aggressive tax avoidance. Highly prominent anti-avoidance rules include transfer 
pricing documentation requirements and interest deduction limits (such as thin capitalization 
rules or earnings-stripping rules).  
These initiatives to fight BEPS are yet to be matched by a thorough understanding of how the 
introduction or the tightening of anti-avoidance legislation affects firms’ profit shifting 
strategies. What has been shown so far is that countermeasures seem to be successful in 
reducing profit shifting via the particular channel1 the measures are targeting but the overall 
effects remain elusive. Existing studies in this area consider profit shifting channels separately 
and find that thin capitalization rules or transfer pricing regulations are strongly effective at 
limiting profit shifting via the respective channel. It is puzzling, however, that the measured 
effectiveness and the suspected increase in the cost of capital (Ruf and Schindler, 2015) does 
not seem to entail negative side effects on investment (Weichenrieder and Windischbauer, 
2008, Buslei and Simmler, 2012). One exception is Buettner et al. (2017) who identify negative 
investment responses for thin capitalization rules but not for transfer pricing rules.  
While these studies tend to focus on the outcome of unobserved profit shifting decisions, 
evidence on the firm-specific mechanisms for developing tax strategies is rather scarce. 
Understanding this mechanism, however, is of great importance for understanding, explaining 
and predicting profit shifting behavior in a changing institutional environment (Shackelford and 
Shevlin, 2001). Due to the nature of firms’ internal decision-making processes, this question is 
difficult to answer with archival data. Nonetheless, recent studies by Hopland et al (2017), de 
Simone (2016), and Kim et al. (2015) show that specific research designs, reform settings and 
                                                            
1 For the effect of anti-avoidance legislation on the debt channel see, for example, Buettner et al, 2012, Blouin et 
al, 2014. For the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations see, for example, Klassen and Laplante, 2012, Blouin 
et al., 2010, Lohse and Riedel, 2013, Beer and Loeprick, 2015, Saunders-Scott, 2015 
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estimation techniques make it possible to draw inferences on the formation of profit strategies 
even from archival data.  
Against this background, the objective of this paper is to further elucidate how profit shifting 
strategies are developed, in particular with respect to firms’ reactions to anti-avoidance 
legislation. The main question we would like to address in this paper is whether firms optimize 
the use of different profit shifting strategies jointly and in particular, whether they substitute 
different profit shifting strategies for one another other if the channel specific costs change due 
to anti-avoidance legislation. This substitution could explain why studies looking at the effect 
of each profit shifting strategy separately find that anti-avoidance legislation has a strong 
effectiveness but little or no effect on investment responses. Our question links to Hopland et 
al. (2017) who investigate the flexibility of adjusting transfer pricing and debt shifting strategies 
within each year to react to changing benefits (due to losses) at given costs. Similar to de 
Simone (2016) we study how institutional changes affect firms’ decisions on profit shifting 
strategies. Finally, identifying substitutive relationships between profit shifting strategies also 
provides indirect evidence for the existence of a target level of tax avoidance as put forward by 
Kim et al. (2015).  
Our identification strategy includes two empirical approaches and focuses on the potential 
interdependency between transfer pricing shifting and debt shifting. Firstly, we use firm-level 
panel data from 2004 to 2012 on European companies from the Amadeus database. During this 
time span, several changes in tax rates and anti-avoidance regulations took place. We analyze 
how restricting one profit shifting channel affects the use of an unrestricted channel and 
determine the effects if both channels are restricted. These conditional reform effects allows us 
to identify substitutive behavior and to disentangle the reduction in profit shifting activity from 
these substitution effects. Secondly, we exploit a tax reform in France that came into force 2007 
as a quasi-experimental setting. This reform tightened thin capitalization rules for one group of 
French affiliates that had been exempt before (in particular firms with European shareholders) 
while the regulations remained unchanged for all other affiliates located in France. Since 
transfer pricing rules and tax rates remained constant in France during our period of 
observation, this reform provides an appropriate setting to complement our findings on the 
substitution of profit shifting channels. In addition to the explicit comparison of treatment and 
control groups, an important advantage of the second design is that the strictness of thin 
capitalization rules and transfer pricing rules do not have to be quantified. In both approaches, 
we take into account that the potential for firms to substitute in particular profit shifting via 
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transfer prices for debt shifting depends on firms’ flexibility to deviate from arm’s length prices. 
This flexibility is closely related to the specificity of intra-group transactions (Dischinger and 
Riedel, 2011). To that end, we also study subsamples of firms belonging to multinational groups 
with a high versus low intellectual property (IP) intensity.  
The conditional reform effects confirm that firms react towards a tightening of transfer pricing 
regulations or thin capitalization rules by reducing profit shifting via the newly restricted 
channel. In addition, we provide new evidence that this reduction is in part due to firms 
substituting the restricted profit shifting strategy with an unrestricted profit shifting strategy. 
Further, we show that if anti-avoidance regulations restrict both channels, firms still have some 
leeway to continue their profit shifting activities via the transfer pricing channel but not via the 
debt channel. This effect is particularly pronounced in firms belonging to IP (intellectual 
property) intensive groups.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief outline of the relevant literature 
on profit shifting decision-making and existing evidence on the impact of anti-avoidance rules. 
Section 3 explains the theoretical rationale of our investigation and outlines the main 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the main data sources and defines the variables used in the 
estimations. In section 5, we explain our two empirical designs. Section 6 presents the results 
of the panel data analysis and the quasi-experimental setting. Section 7 summarizes our main 
findings and concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
Existing research on profit shifting can be divided up into four broader research questions: 
(1) What characterizes BEPS in terms of the consequences for reported profits (tax rate 
elasticity, identification issues, proxies for BEPS)? (e.g. meta-study by Heckemeyer and 
Overesch, 2017, surveys by Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010, Dharmapala, 2014) 
(2) Can we identify determinants of BEPS that explain the observed heterogeneity in profit 
shifting behavior? (e.g. Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, Dyreng, 2010, Robinson et al., 2012, 
Armstrong et al., 2013, Rego and Wilson, 2012, Armstrong et al., 2015)  
(3) What are the firm-level mechanisms enabling profit shifting, and how do firms develop their 
tax strategies? (e.g. survey evidence by Klassen et al., 2017, Hoopes et al., 2015, evidence from 
archival data by Hopland et al., 2017, de Simone, 2016, Kim et al., 2015). 
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(4) Which channels/strategies are used to reallocate profits to lower tax jurisdictions and how 
effective are anti-avoidance regulations? (e.g. Buettner et al, 2014, Buettner et al, 2012, Blouin 
et al, 2014, Beer and Loeprick, 2015, Lohse and Riedel, 2013, Saunders-Scott, 2015) 
While the first two questions are fairly well understood so far, evidence on the firm-specific 
mechanisms for developing tax strategies are rather scarce. In this context, survey studies 
provide crucial insights into what has been called the “black box” of profit shifting (Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010) Due to the nature of internal corporate decision-making processes, this 
question is difficult to answer with archival data. Nonetheless, recent studies by Hopland et al 
(2017), de Simone (2016), and Kim et al. (2015) address the call from Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001) to move beyond merely documenting income shifting to better explaining, 
understanding and predicting it.  
Based on valuable insights from the tradeoff literature, which suggest that firms trade off tax 
benefits against the costs of tax planning, Kim et al. (2015) explicitly investigate whether firms 
adjust to a target level of tax avoidance and how quickly they meet this target. This is a relevant 
question due to the constantly evolving tax environment faced by firms. They use data from 
Compustat for the years 1990-2011 and estimate a partial adjustment model as is often used in 
the literature on capital structure choice (e.g. Flannery and Rangan, 2006). In this partial 
adjustment model, firms close a part of the gap between the actual and the target level of tax 
avoidance each year. The regression coefficient yields the speed of adjustment. Kim et al. 
(2015) use cash ETR and GAAP ETR as dependent variables, which they explain by the 
determinants of tax avoidance documented in the literature. Their results confirm the notion 
that firms actually possess target levels of tax avoidance which they move towards? A typical 
firm closes about 69% of the gap between actual tax avoidance and target level of avoidance 
within three years, which is faster than the speed of adjustment documented for capital structure 
choice. This speed of adjustment is shown to be heterogeneous and is, for example, higher for 
multinational firms.  
Hopland et al. (2017) also look at the adjustment of profit shifting decisions and in particular 
investigate firms’ flexibility in terms of using income shifting strategies within a single tax year 
to react to operating losses. They consider transfer prices and debt as profit shifting strategies 
which can potentially be adjusted to shift profits into group entities making a loss either ex-post 
(after the fiscal year), or ex-ante (before the current year). Based on Norwegian Data on direct 
transfer payments and internal debt for the years 1998-2005, they show that firms react to 
operating losses by adjusting transfer prices ex-post. Since they do not find such flexibility for 
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debt shifting, they conclude that firms tend to take decisions on debt shifting at the beginning 
of each year when the likelihood of operating losses can only be anticipated. According to 
Hopland et al. (2017) the reason why most studies find only small tax rate sensitivities of debt 
is because they neglect the timing of debt shifting decisions in view of anticipated losses.  
De Simone (2016) also investigates how firms make profit shifting decisions and in this context 
focuses on how a particular accounting change (the introduction of IFRS for unconsolidated 
financial reporting in Europe) interacts with tax incentives to affect profit shifting. Her research 
design exploits the fact that the mandatory or voluntary introduction of IFRS for unconsolidated 
accounts increases multinationals’ ability to justify favorable transfer prices, as the pool of 
comparable firms (using IFRS reporting) grows larger. Based on unconsolidated data from the 
AMADEUS database for the years 2003 to 2012, she estimates the income shifting model from 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) augmented by an indicator variable for IFRS adoption affiliate-
years. Her results show that the average mandatory IFRS adopting affiliate shifts 11.5 percent 
more profits relative to pre-adoption and non-adopter affiliate-years.  
Our study is closely related to the above studies that look into how profit shifting decisions are 
made. Based on a better understanding of that mechanism, we want to provide new insights into 
the question of how firms react to changes in the taxation environment, in particular with respect 
to anti-avoidance regulations such as thin capitalization rules and transfer pricing rules. The 
following paragraphs provide a brief outline of the existing empirical evidence on the impact 
of these anti-avoidance rules. With one exception (Saunders-Scott, 2015), the studies all look 
at each profit shifting channel separately and do not consider a potential interdependency 
between both channels or mutual effects of the countermeasures.  
With respect to debt shifting, Wamser (2014), Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008), and 
Overesch and Wamser (2010) find a reduction in intra-group loans granted to German 
companies by their foreign affiliates following a German tax reform in 2001 which tightened 
thin capitalization rules. Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) also study the effect of thin 
capitalization rules on real investment in multinational enterprises; however, they do not find a 
visible impact. Buettner et al. (2012) confirm the negative impact of interest deduction 
restrictions on the use of intra-group debt based on comprehensive micro-level data from the 
Microdatabase Direct Investment (MIDI) database on German outbound investment. A recent 
study by Blouin et al. (2014) investigates the influence of interest deduction restrictions on a 
company’s leverage using micro-level data on US multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries 
in 54 countries over the period between 1982 and 2004. They find that the presence of interest 
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deduction restrictions reduces an affiliate’s debt-to-assets ratio, with more pronounced results 
in cases where there are more limitations on borrowing from a parent company compared to 
other group members. Furthermore, they posit that interest deduction restrictions on leverage 
have a stronger impact in countries that automatically apply anti-avoidance rules, in contrast to 
countries that have discretionary enforcement. 
Testing the impact of transfer pricing documentation requirements is not straightforward, as the 
strictness of these rules is much more difficult to measure. Based on sectoral data, Bartelsman 
and Beetsma (2003) empirically illustrate that international differences in corporate income tax 
rates along with several other attributes of the tax system including an enforcement of transfer 
pricing regulations constitute major incentives or discouragements for multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) to shift profits. Lohse and Riedel (2013) develop an indicator for transfer pricing 
strictness and find that transfer pricing regulations substantially reduce the tax sensitivity of 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) of up to 80%. Beer and Loeprick (2015) use the years 
since the introduction of mandatory documentation requirements as a strictness indicator and 
show that within four years of the introduction of mandatory documentation requirements, the 
amount of profits being shifted between subsidiaries of MNEs decreases by around 60%. They 
show that the profit shifting behavior of subsidiaries with high intangibles-to-total-assets ratios 
is less influenced by documentation requirements than the profit shifting behavior of affiliates 
with a low fraction of intangible assets.  
So far, only Saunders-Scott (2013) tests whether thin capitalization rules have an impact on 
EBIT. This effect can be interpreted as a first sign of a potential substitutive relationship 
between the transfer pricing and the debt shifting channel because a direct influence via interest 
payments is ruled out by using EBIT as a dependent variable. Her results support this 
hypothesis, with the implementation of thin capitalization rules in an affiliate’s country 
reducing its earnings before interest and tax by 3.8%. Conditional effects of both anti-avoidance 
regulations, however, are not taken into account.  
In view of the broad evidence on the effectiveness of thin capitalization and transfer pricing 
rules, it remains puzzling that most studies do not find negative side effects on investments or 
employment. Closing down profit shifting opportunities should lead to an increase in the cost 
of capital thus inducing negative investment responses. So far, only one study has been able to 
establish the expected negative effect on FDI (Buettner et al., 2017). Their results indicate that 
introducing or tightening a thin capitalization rule exerts significant adverse effects on FDI (-
2.5%) and employment in high-tax countries. Meanwhile, they do not find such a negative side 
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effect for transfer pricing regulations despite the strong effectiveness of these rules shown in 
existing studies. They conclude that further research is needed to determine the reasons behind 
the lack of real responses to the strengthening of transfer pricing regulations.   
Our paper aims to contribute to this strand of the literature by providing new insights into the 
question of how profit shifting decisions are made and, in particular, whether firms substitute 
one profit shifting strategy for another when the costs of these strategies change. This 
substitution could explain why previous studies were not able to establish a clear link between 
anti-avoidance regulations and the investment behavior of multinationals.  
3 Theoretical Considerations and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 A profit shifting model with two profit shifting channels 
We consider a multinational corporation that consists of two affiliates that reside in two 
different countries: a high-tax country with a tax rate τH and a low-tax country with a tax rate 
τL. The high-tax affiliate can shift part or all of its true pre-tax profit πH to the affiliate in the 
low-tax country. πH is defined as the taxable profit that would have been reported in the absence 
of profit shifting.2 The true profit can be shifted from the high-tax to the low-tax affiliate by 
increasing internal debt or manipulating interest rates on intra-group loans. It can also be 
relocated by increasing intra-group trade or overpaying for intangible assets, tangible goods, 
and services provided by the low-tax affiliate. S denotes the combined volume of shifted profits 
via the channel of internal debt and intra-group trade. The respective intra-group payments are 
deductible from the tax base of the high-tax affiliate and increase the low-tax affiliate’s profits 
πL. 
Profit shifting may induce costs C, which are assumed to be non-tax-deductible.3 These costs 
may be split into general (or non-channel-specific) costs and channel-specific costs, depending 
on whether they arise from the use of a particular profit shifting channel or from profit shifting 
as such. Further, we can distinguish costs related to tax regulations (general: tax enforcement, 
tax audit probabilities relating to overall shifting volume; specific: anti-avoidance rules 
targeting specific profit shifting channels). General costs may result from an increased risk of 
being audited, an increased need for mitigation strategies, as well as potential adjustments of 
intra-group transactions via one or both channels if profits are below a certain threshold. In 
                                                            
2 See Fuest et al. (2011). 
3 Some costs may in fact be tax-deductible (see Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013). We assume that the deductibility 
of shifting costs does not fundamentally affect our results. 
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addition, by shifting high volumes of profits MNEs may run the risk of damaging their 
reputation. Moreover, a multinational might also have to bear the costs of complying with the 
regulations aimed at tackling intra-group profit shifting and of establishing circumvention 
strategies. For example, an arm’s length principle is a basic anti-avoidance regulation, which 
requires intra-group transactions to follow the same conditions as transactions between 
independent parties and targets both profit shifting channels.4  
The channel-specific costs include negative channel-specific side effects from profit shifting. 
Despite a potentially lower capacity to raise external debt, there are no obvious costs from side 
effects of profit shifting via intra-group debt.5 By contrast, profit shifting via transfer pricing 
manipulation potentially results in conflicts within internal performance measurement and 
incentive programs.6 This subsequently leads to inefficiency costs that increase with a growing 
difference between the real transfer price and the tax-optimal transfer price.7 If companies use 
two sets of books for tax-optimal transfer prices and internal transfer prices, these inefficiency 
costs can be avoided, which results in the shifting costs being limited to the additional 
administrative expenses needed to operate a two-book system.8 Moreover, some countries have 
introduced channel-specific anti-avoidance regulations such as transfer pricing rules and 
interest deduction limits.  
Assuming that C represents both the channel-specific and the general costs of profit shifting, 
the aim of the multinational corporation is to maximize its total after-tax profit Π as shown in 
equation 1. 
                                        Π ൌ ሺ1 െ τH	ሻሺπH െ Sሻ ൅	ሺ1 െ τL	ሻሺπL ൅ Sሻ െ ܥ																																		ሺ1ሻ 
It can be identified from equation 1 that the optimal amount of shifting out of the high-tax 
country S* arises when the tax advantage from profit shifting equals marginal costs: 
                                      ∂C߲ܵ∗ ൌ ሺτH െ τL	ሻ	 with τH ൌ 0 if ܵ ൐ πH																											ሺ2ሻ 
                                                            
4 See Eden (2009) and see Zinn et al. (2014) for a cross-country overview. 
5 Costs from secondary effects that arise from external debt financing, in particular bankruptcy costs and costs 
from information asymmetries, do not play a relevant role in determining internal financing under a precondition 
that the total third-party debt of a multinational corporation defines its risk of bankruptcy. See Chowdhry and 
Nanda (1994), Gordon (2010), and Overesch and Wamser (2014) for further details. 
6 These costs arise from tax induced intra-group transactions that deviate from the optimal structure of intra-group 
trade from a management perspective. 
7 See Hiemann and Reichelstein (2012). 
8 See Hiemann and Reichelstein (2012), p. 4. 
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According to equation 2, the tax advantage from profit shifting will be zero or negative for each 
unit of profit shifted in excess of the high-tax affiliate’s true profit because the corresponding 
deductions will not reduce its tax payments in the same year.  
If we consider profit shifting via debt or transfer prices as two alternative “input factors” 
producing the “output” shifted profits, the value of shifting one unit via a certain channel equals 
the value of shifting one unit via the other channel. Hence, the multinational is per se indifferent 
as to which of these two input factors it uses and will always choose the cheaper shifting 
channel.  
Consequently, the total cost function of profit shifting is derived from the minimum cost 
combinations of the two input factors (which equal the two shifting channels) for all potential 
output levels: 
                                          		C	ሺS∗் 	ሺSሻ, S஽∗ 	ሺSሻሻ ൌ 	∑ ܥ்௫ୀௌ೅
∗ሺௌሻ
௫ୀ଴ ሺݔሻ ൅	∑ ܥ஽௬ୀௌವ
∗ ሺௌሻ
௬ୀ଴ ሺݕሻ																										ሺ3ሻ 
In equation 6, CT(x) and CD(y) denote the costs of shifting unit x via transfer pricing and unit y 
via debt. Whether substituting one profit channel for the other is optimal depends on how these 
costs per shifted unit are determined. Following the existing literature, we assume that all profit 
shifting costs are convex in the amount of shifted profits.9 This can be formalized as follows: 
																																												ܥ௜ሺ ௜ܵሻ, ܥ௜ᇱሺ ௜ܵሻ ൐ 0		 and 		ܥ௜ᇱᇱሺ ௜ܵሻ ൐ 0		 with    ݅	ሾܦ, ܶ, ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽሿ		                    ሺ4ሻ 
3.2 Substitution of Profit Shifting Channels 
Firms trade off the tax advantage of profit shifting against its costs. The optimal shifting amount 
is achieved if marginal costs of shifting equal the marginal benefits, i.e. the tax rate differential 
between high and low tax jurisdictions. When the costs change, firms converge to a new 
optimum. This raises the question in which cases we might observe one profit channel being 
substituted for the other. The conclusions depend on the respective underlying cost structure. 
We consider two cases: (1) The costs of profit shifting depend exclusively on the amount shifted 
via the respective channel and not on the total amount shifted. Hence, the costs of debt shifting 
have no influence on the cost of transfer pricing shifting or vice versa. (2) Non-channel-specific 
costs of shifting exist that depend on the total amount of profits shifted via both channels (e.g. 
due to higher audit risk, damage to the firm’s reputation etc.). 
                                                            
9 See as examples: Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), p. 7 and Saunders-Scott (2015). 
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The costs of profit shifting depend exclusively on the amount shifted via the respective channel 
and not on the total amount shifted. 
If the costs for each profit shifting channel depend only on the volume of profits shifted via the 
respective channel (i.e. CT(ST) and CD(SD)),10 the optimal amount of profit shifting from the 
high-tax country to the low-tax country via each channel is determined by equations 5 and 6. 
                                 ∂ܥܦሺܵܦ
∗ ሻ
߲ܵܦ∗ ൌ ሺτH െ τL	ሻ	 with τH ൌ 0 if ܵ ൐ πH																								ሺ5ሻ 
																																						∂ܥܶሺܵ∗ܶ ሻ߲ܵ∗ܶ ൌ ሺτH െ τL	ሻ	 with τH ൌ 0 if ܵ ൐ πH																								ሺ6ሻ 
Whether it is optimal to switch to the other profit shifting channel following a cost increase of 
the channel currently used depends on the cost level of total profit shifted in the optimum before 
the change. If the optimal amount of profit shifting has been below the total true profits (S* < 
πH), an increase in the marginal channel-specific costs will decrease the optimal amount of 
profit shifted via this channel while leaving the amount shifted via the other channel unchanged 
as neither its costs nor the determination of the tax benefits are influenced. In this case, no 
substitution will occur.  
By contrast, if it has been optimal to shift total true profits (S* = πH), an increase in the channel-
specific costs may either have no impact on profit shifting behaviour at all or reduce the optimal 
amount being shifted via this channel. This is because, the marginal benefit function is a step 
function which is constant with the positive values of the tax differential (τH  – τL) up to the 
amount of total true profit and turns negative for all units above the total true profits. It is, thus, 
possible that the last unit shifted via one or both profit shifting channels in the optimum bears 
marginal costs below the tax advantage (τH – τL). Up to the level of the true profits, the company 
will always choose the cheaper channel for each unit shifted. For this reason, if the costs of one 
channel increase while still remaining below the tax rate differential and also leaving the price 
ratio of the two channels for all units of shifted profits unaffected, the shifted amount via both 
channels should remain unchanged. Again, no substitution occurs.  
If, ceteris paribus, the price ratio reverses for certain units of shifted profits because of the 
increase of the costs of one channel (that now exceed the marginal costs of the other channel), 
the amount shifted via the channel with increased costs should decline and the amount shifted 
via the other channel should increase. With respect to equations 5 and 6, this substitution of one 
                                                            
10 See Saunders-Scott (2015) for different assumptions regarding the cost function. 
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channel for another in response to a reversion of the price ratio for certain units of shifted profits 
results from a change in the value of τH (from its real value to zero and vice versa) in both 
equations. In addition, if it is optimal to shift total true profits, an increase in the cost of one 
channel also decreases the amount shifted via this channel if the marginal costs rise above the 
tax advantage (τH – τL). A substitution for the other channel will only then be optimal if the last 
unit shifted via the other channel yields costs below or equal to the tax differential. 
Non-channel-specific costs of shifting exist that depend on the total amount of profits shifted 
via both channels 
Given that the probability of being audited rises with the total amount of profits shifted or that 
the risk to the firm’s increases if the large scale of total profits shifted becomes public, it is 
likely that there is also a cost component of profit shifting that is not channel-specific but 
depends on the total amount shifted via both channels. In this case, the high-tax affiliate 
determines the optimal amount of shifting using the two channels according to the following 
conditions: 
                                 ∂ܥܦሺܵ
∗ሻ
߲ܵ∗ ൌ ሺτH െ τL	ሻ	 with τH ൌ 0 if ܵ ൐ πH																						ሺ7ሻ 
																																						∂ܥܶሺܵ∗ሻ߲ܵ∗ ൌ ሺτH െ τL	ሻ	 with τH ൌ 0 if ܵ ൐ πH																						ሺ8ሻ 
Equations 7 and 8 establish that the marginal profit shifting costs of each channel no longer 
depend on the amount shifted via the respective channel only (as in equations 5 and 6) but on 
the total amount S*. In this setting, an increase in the channel-specific shifting costs for one 
channel potentially induces substitution for the other channel regardless of whether the total 
amount shifted is close to or considerably below the true profits πH.  This is because an increase 
in the channel-specific costs of a certain channel will increase the marginal costs of profit 
shifting for this channel and consequently reduces the optimal amount that can be shifted via 
this channel and, ceteris paribus, the total amount of profits shifted S. The reduction in the total 
amount shifted S, in turn, reduces the marginal costs of shifting via the other channel with 
unchanged channel-specific costs, thus inducing an increase in the optimal level of profits 
shifted via this channel. Part of the initial reduction of profit shifting via the channel facing 
increased costs is therefore substituted with an increase in profit shifting via the other channel.  
In summary, if the shifting costs are entirely channel-specific, companies may only substitute 
between the channels if it is optimal to shift the total true profits. However, if there are other 
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non-channel-specific costs which depend on the total amount shifted via both channels, 
companies may substitute one channel for another even if it is optimal to shift less than the total 
true profits.  
3.3 Development of Hypotheses 
The considerations above suggest situations where changes in channel specific profit shifting 
costs should induce substitution between both channels. In the following, we focus on anti-
avoidance regulations as important drivers of channel-specific profit shifting costs. We look at 
the interdependency of debt shifting and transfer pricing shifting, which are considered 
important instruments for the cross-border allocation of profits to low tax jurisdictions. We 
derive our hypotheses starting from a situation where specific anti-avoidance regulations are 
absent and only a general arm’s length principle applies. Sequentially, we add restrictions for 
each channel separately and finally consider a simultaneous application of anti-avoidance 
regulations for both channels. To acknowledge that firms differ in their profit shifting potential 
especially with respect to the degree of leeway they have to adjust transfer prices upwards or 
downwards, we distinguish between firms belonging to multinational groups with an above-
average share of intellectual property and those below. The rational is that we expect firms with 
highly specific intra-group transactions related to the use of intellectual property to be more 
flexible in setting tax minimizing transfer prices, which are more difficult for fiscal authorities 
to challenge.  
In the absence of formal anti-avoidance regulations, the arm’s length principle still applies. 
With regard to intra-group debt, Burnett (2014) posits that there is usually a large range of 
possible arm’s length amounts of debt and corresponding interest rates, which form a 
comparison group for intra-group borrowing in multinationals. In the case of intra-group royalty 
payments, an arm’s length price is often hard to determine due to the highly specific nature of 
intangible assets. Therefore, it is relatively easy to justify high levels of profit shifting via this 
channel, even when the arm’s length principle is applied. With respect to the transfer of 
common tangible goods and services, Dawson and Miller (2009) note that companies should 
find themselves more restricted in their profit shifting behaviour even in the absence of detailed 
transfer pricing regulations, since tax authorities may compare related-party transactions to the 
available third-party payments. As a result, for corporations that trade tangible assets or services 
that are easy to value, severe transfer pricing manipulation may result in double taxation even 
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if no strict transfer pricing regulations exist. Based on these considerations, we derive 
Hypothesis 1 of our study: 
H1: In absence of strict anti-avoidance regulations, non-IP-intensive companies mainly 
shift profits via intra-group debt, whereas IP-intensive firms shift profits via royalty 
payments. 
If a high-tax country has thin capitalization rules in place, interest payments on debt above the 
safe haven ratio will no longer be deductible and face double taxation. Consequently, the tax 
benefit of profit shifting will turn negative for excess interest payments. For companies relying 
on the debt channel, it will be optimal to reduce the amount shifted via intra-group interest 
payments below the threshold. Likewise, if a high-tax country introduces transfer-pricing rules 
(in the absence of thin capitalization rules) a multinational corporation will face the additional 
costs of documenting transfer prices if any intra-group transactions are present. In addition, 
strict transfer pricing regulations reduce the flexibility of setting tax minimizing transfer prices 
if justifying this price becomes more costly. For companies using transfer prices for profit 
shifting, it will be optimal to reduce the amount shifted via transfer prices. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2a is straightforward and reads:  
H2a: If one profit shifting channel is becoming more costly, firms using this channel 
will reduce the amount shifted via this channel. 
Under the conditions described in Section 3.2, i.e. if either total economic profits are shifted or 
the optimal amounts shifted via each channel also depend on the total amount shifted, we can 
expect substitutive behavior. As a result, if the costs of profit shifting via the transfer pricing 
channel increase and the costs of debt shifting remain stable or vice versa, firms may rely more 
heavily on the unrestricted channel as long as the marginal costs do not exceed the marginal 
benefits. Of course, such a substitution will only take place in firms that have been using the 
respective profit shifting channel prior to the restriction.  
Hypothesis 2b thus reads: 
H2b: If one profit shifting channel is becoming more costly while the other channel is 
unrestricted, firms may substitute shifting via the restricted channel with profit shifting 
via the unrestricted channel. 
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Turning to a setting in which an anti-avoidance rule is introduced and/or strengthened for one 
channel while the other channel is already restricted, the substitution of transfer pricing shifting 
for debt shifting might still occur but not vice versa. Transfer pricing regulations are typically 
more flexible than thin capitalization rules, which establish a fixed threshold of deductible 
interest expenses. Determining the arm’s length price is often very difficult, particularly in the 
case of firm-specific IP due to missing comparable transactions. Consequently, in the presence 
of transfer pricing regulations and thin capitalization rules it is not unlikely that firms substitute 
debt shifting with transfer pricing shifting as long as the marginal tax advantage still offsets the 
increased costs of documenting and justifying the manipulated transfer price. Firms are, 
however, unlikely to substitute debt shifting for transfer pricing shifting in this situation, as thin 
capitalization rules are prohibitive in the sense that the fixed threshold for deductible interest 
eliminates the tax advantage of shifting any Euro of interest above the threshold.  
Consequently, Hypothesis H3a states: 
H3a: If thin capitalization rules are introduced in cases where transfer pricing rules 
are already strict, firms may still be able to substitute transfer pricing shifting for debt 
shifting.  
The more specific (or IP reliant) intra-group transactions are, the easier it should be for firms 
to substitute transfer pricing shifting for debt shifting in the presence of existing transfer pricing 
rules.  On the contrary, the leeway for transfer pricing manipulation is likely to be smaller in 
the case of tangible goods compared to intangible assets. We capture this in H3b: 
H3b: The potential to substitute transfer pricing shifting for debt shifting in the presence 
of transfer pricing regulations and thin capitalization rules should be higher for IP-
intensive firms.  
4 Data 
4.1 Firm-Level Data 
We use firm-level data from the Amadeus database provided by the Bureau van Dijk in the 
empirical section of our paper. This database includes accounting information and data on group 
structures for more than 21 million companies in Europe. We limit our sample to firms that 
report unconsolidated accounts, since we require information on the activities of single 
companies. In addition, we focus on the affiliates of MNEs and exclude purely domestic firms 
from our sample. In order to determine these multinational groups, we use information on direct 
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parent firms and their subsidiaries.11 Since intra-group profit shifting requires a substantial 
ownership share, we follow Beer and Loeprick (2015) and consider affiliates with an ownership 
share of at least 90%. Furthermore, we exclude headquarter firms from our sample due to the 
findings of Dischinger and Riedel (2010) and Dischinger et al. (2014) who argue that the 
location of profits and profitable assets may be biased in favor of the headquarters. Moreover, 
loss-making firms are excluded because they face different tax planning incentives than 
profitable enterprises (see Huizinga and Laeven, 2008 and Dischinger and Riedel, 2011). 
Finally, we eliminate firms active in the financial sector as well as years with implausible values 
for our main variables of interest. 
Our empirical analysis includes two identification strategies: the first identification strategy 
employs a panel of European companies that belong to a multinational group.12 This analysis 
covers the period between 2004 and 2012 and includes firms located in 32 countries. In total, 
103,714 firms provided the information required for the analysis of the substitution of profit 
shifting via transfer prices for debt shifting and 85,949 companies provide the necessary data 
for the analysis of debt shifting as a substitute for profit shifting via transfer prices. Table A1 
in the appendix gives an overview of a cross-country distribution of observations in this sample. 
The second identification strategy is established by conducting a difference-in-difference 
estimation of a tax reform that was introduced in France in 2007. For this analysis, we use a 
balanced panel of 1,040 French affiliates of multinational groups in the period between 2004 
and 2009.  
4.2 Data on Tax Rates and Anti-Avoidance Regulations 
The data on tax rates was obtained from the EU Commission’s effective tax rates report and 
augmented by the University of Oxford’s CBT Tax database, Ernst & Young’s Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guides and the Global Corporate Tax Handbooks published by the International 
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). The information on transfer pricing regulations was 
collected from the transfer pricing guides published by Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and 
PwC. Data on thin-capitalization and earnings stripping rules was obtained from Global 
Corporate Tax Handbooks. For both types of anti-avoidance rules, we consider not only their 
                                                            
11 Since data on ownership is static in the Amadeus database, we use information on ownership structures in 2012 
and assume that it did not change in previous years.  
12 We define a company as a part of a multinational group if at least one firm in the group is located in a different 
country. 
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presence but also their level of strictness, since tough regulations are more likely to have an 
impact on profit shifting behavior of MNEs.  
Our main measure of transfer pricing strictness are the years since the introduction of mandatory 
transfer pricing documentation requirements (Beer and Loeprick, 2015). Transfer pricing 
documentation requirements constitute a crucial element of increasing transparency in the 
determination of transfer prices. The length of time in which these rules have been in force is a 
plausible proxy for its strictness as it usually takes tax authorities several years or more to gain 
the necessary experience and knowledge of intra-group transfer prices to effectively detect 
mispricing. A further important advantage is its clear definition making it an objective measure 
of strictness. For the empirical estimation, it also brings a lot of variation. Other papers use 
different variables to measure the strictness of transfer pricing rules and in order to ensure that 
our findings are robust, we test our baseline results by employing a binary transfer pricing 
variable comparable to the one used by Lohse and Riedel (2013). This variable also focuses on 
formal transfer pricing documentation rules. However, it does not take into consideration how 
long the rules have been in place and therefore exhibits significantly less variation in our 
dataset. The variable is set to one if formal transfer pricing documentation rules exist and equals 
zero otherwise. In a further robustness check, we take into account the existence of informal 
transfer pricing documentation rules. Informal transfer pricing documentation requirements 
exist if a country has not explicitly implemented the requirements for transfer pricing 
documentation in its tax law but requires the preparation of transfer pricing documentation in 
practice. We use a measure for the existence of informal transfer pricing rules while 
simultaneously controlling for the years since the introduction of formal transfer pricing 
regulations. The respective variable is set to zero if neither formal nor informal transfer pricing 
documentation rules exist and it is equal to one if informal transfer pricing documentation rules 
are present. Furthermore, starting from the year in which formal transfer pricing documentation 
rules are introduced, the years following their introduction are also counted. Table A2 in the 
appendix gives an overview of the formal and informal transfer pricing documentation rules 
across all countries in our sample.  
In our baseline analysis, we rely on a comprehensive variable that enables thin-capitalization 
rules and earnings stripping regulations to be taken into account. This variable classifies interest 
deduction restrictions into three different categories as follows: all countries that do not have 
rules restricting the deductibility of interest payments (which go beyond a general application 
of the arm’s length principle) are assigned to category 1. Countries that apply thin capitalization 
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rules with a safe haven ratio above the average safe haven ratio of all countries in the sample 
(which is 3) are assigned to category 2. Countries that do not use a general thin capitalization 
rule but apply some kind of anti-avoidance regulation against excessive intra-group debt 
shifting are also classified in this category.13 In addition, countries that have a general thin 
capitalization rule with a safe haven ratio of 3 or less but exclude a broad range of transactions 
from their application are also assigned to category 2.14 Category 3 comprises all countries that 
apply a thin capitalization rule with a safe haven ratio of 3 or below without broad exceptions. 
In addition, the earnings stripping rules applicable in Germany (from 2008), Italy (from 2008), 
and Spain (from 2012) are assigned to category 3. This reflects the fact that particularly in Italy 
and Spain the earnings stripping rules have been perceived to be stricter than the thin 
capitalization rules that were previously applicable. In Germany, assigning earnings stripping 
rules to category 3 reflects an unchanged level of strictness compared to prior years where a 
thin capitalization rule with a debt-to-equity ratio of 3:1 was present. Table A3 in the appendix 
summarizes our main indicator for interest deduction limitations by country and year. 
In addition, we implement a robustness check by including an alternative proxy for interest 
deduction restrictions in our benchmark estimation. Here, we attempt to reflect the safe harbor 
debt-to-equity ratio15 in countries with thin capitalization rules. According to Buettner et al. 
(2012), a direct use of this ratio is not feasible, since it approaches infinity when no restrictions 
are imposed. Therefore, we follow Buettner et al. (2012) who conduct a non-linear 
transformation of the safe harbor ratio denoted by   and use it as a proxy for the strictness of 
thin capitalization rules.16 
                                                             ܵݐݎ݅ܿݐ݊݁ݏݏ ൌ 11൅σ	                                                   (10) 
In equation 10, Strictness stands for the measure of the strictness of thin capitalization rules and 
 denotes a country’s safe harbor ratio. Strictness can only be determined for countries that 
apply a thin capitalization rule; therefore, it is equal to zero if a country does not have these 
types of regulations. The level of the safe haven ratio varies between 1.5 and 8 in our sample, 
which yields a maximum value of 0.5 for the strictness indicator. Table A3 in the appendix 
                                                            
13 Table 9 in the appendix provides information on these special interest deduction limitations. 
14 An example includes France during the years between 2004 and 2006, during which time only interest payments 
to parent companies resident in certain non-EU countries where covered by thin capitalization rules. 
15 A safe harbor debt-to-equity ratio indicates the level up to which interest deduction can be safely granted by the 
host-country’s tax system. See OECD (1987) for more details. 
16 See Buettner et al. (2012), p. 933. 
19 
 
gives an overview of the debt-to-equity ratios applied under thin capitalization rules in the 
countries under analysis.  
4.3 Macroeconomic Controls 
The data on gross domestic product (GDP), GDP growth, and GDP per-capita was extracted 
from the World Bank’s Development Indicators17 and is measured in constant USD. We also 
obtained the information on the unemployment rate from the World Bank’s Development 
Indicators. This indicator represents a country’s total unemployment rate as a percentage of its 
total labor force as estimated by the International Labor Office. Information on corruption is 
derived from the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator.18 Data on inflation is taken 
from the database World Economic Outlook19 provided by the International Monetary Fund 
which reflects the percentage change in average consumer prices. Table A6 in the appendix 
provides detailed descriptive statistics on all variables included in the panel estimation. Table 
A7 gives an overview of all variables included in the analysis of the French tax reform. 
5 Research Design 
5.1 Estimation Based on the Variation of Tax Parameters over Time 
To test whether firms’ decisions on profit shifting involve cost-induced substitution of different 
profit shifting channels, we augment existing approaches with proxies for the costs of the 
respective other profit shifting channel. To that end, we look at the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT 
not only at different strictness levels of transfer pricing regulations but also at different 
strictness levels of interest deduction restrictions. The latter do not have a direct or technical 
impact on the dependent variable as EBIT explicitly exclude interest payments. Hence, the 
measured effect can only be an indirect one via more transfer pricing shifting. This allows us 
to identify a potential substitution of transfer pricing shifting for debt shifting if interest 
deduction limitations are introduced. This first step of the analysis is similar to Saunders-Scott 
(2015). In order to test whether this substitution is also mirrored by an opposing effect for debt 
shifting, we augment the standard regression of debt ratio on interest deduction limitation rules 
by an indicator for transfer pricing strictness. Again, no technical relationship exists, which 
means that the identified impact can be considered an indication that the two profit shifting 
                                                            
17 See World Bank (2017). 
18 See World Bank (2016). 
19 See International Monetary Fund (2016). 
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strategies are substituted for one another. According to our hypotheses, the scope for 
substitution is different in settings where both channels are restricted. We test this by studying 
also the triple interaction of the tax rate, transfer pricing strictness and interest deduction 
limitations, which reflects the impact of one anti-avoidance regulation conditional on the 
strictness of the other. 
The full specification of the EBIT regression is shown in equation 11:  
														ܮ݋݃ሺܧܤܫܶሻ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ ൅	ߚଶܶ ௜ܲ௧ ൅	ߚଷܥܫ ௜ܶ௧	x	ܶ ௜ܲ௧ ൅	ߚସܶܥ௜௧ ൅																		 ሺ11ሻ 
																		൅	ߚହܥܫ ௜ܶ௧	x	ܶܥ௜௧ ൅	ߚ଺ܶܥ௜௧	x	ܶ ௜ܲ௧ ൅	ߚ଻ܥܫ ௜ܶ௧	x	ܶ ௜ܲ௧	x	ܶܥ௜௧ ൅ 
൅	ߚ଼	ܺ´௜௧ ൅ μ௜ ൅ ߜ௝௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧																																													 
Log(EBIT) is the dependent variable that denotes a natural logarithm of earnings before interest 
and taxes of affiliate i in year t. CIT represents a corporate income tax rate augmented by local 
taxes on profits levied in year t in the country where firm i resides and reflects the general profit 
shifting incentive (Lohse and Riedel, 2013, Beer and Loeprick, 2015). We expect its coefficient 
to be negative. Furthermore, in line with Lohse and Riedel (2013), Beer and Loeprick (2015), 
and Saunders-Scott (2015), we expect that strict transfer pricing regulations TP effectively 
reduce the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT (ߚଷ ൐ 0). According to our hypothesis the tax rate 
sensitivity of EBIT should become more negative (ߚହ ൏ 0) if interest deduction restrictions are 
tightened but transfer pricing regulations remain weak. While the double interaction reflects the 
case where the other profit shifting channel remains unrestricted, the triple interaction captures 
the conditional effect if both channels are strict. According to our hypothesis H3a, we expect 
that some leeway for substitution towards transfer pricing shifting persists	ሺߚ଻ ൏ 0). 
ܺ´ represents a vector of relevant firm- and country-level controls that determine true profits 
and vary over time. It includes companies’ main input factors, such as fixed assets and 
employees costs. In addition, it captures a host country’s characteristics including GDP, GDP 
per capita, GDP growth rate, and unemployment rate. μ௜  and ߜ௝௧  are company and industry-
year fixed effects respectively, with ߝ௜௧ representing an error term. 
In order to trace the substitution effect also on the level of the debt channel, we look at the tax 
rate sensitivity of the debt ratio (loans to total assets) at different strictness levels of anti-
avoidance rules. This can be considered an extension of studies like Desai et al. (2004), 
Overesch and Wamser (2010), Buettner and Wamser (2013), and Wamser (2014). In equation 
12, DebtRatio is the dependent variable and it denotes loans to total assets by firm i in year t. 
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Previous authors in this field of literature have used affiliate’s total or internal debt as a 
dependent variable. However, our data does not allow us to distinguish between internal and 
external debt. The full specification of the debt regression is shown in equation 12:  
															ܦܾ݁ݐܴܽݐ݅݋௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ ൅	ߚଶܶ ௜ܲ௧ ൅	ߚଷܥܫ ௜ܶ௧	x	ܶ ௜ܲ௧ ൅																	 ሺ12ሻ 
																																		൅	ߚସܶܥ௜௧ ൅	ߚହܥܫ ௜ܶ௧	x	ܶܥ௜௧	 ൅ 	ߚ଺ܶܥ௜௧	x	ܶ ௜ܲ௧ ൅	 
																																							൅	ߚ଻ܥܫ ௜ܶ௧	x	ܶ ௜ܲ௧	x	ܶܥ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଼	ܺ´௜௧ ൅ μ௜ ൅ ߜ௝௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
The main independent variables of interest CIT, TP, and TC are identical to the ones described 
in equation 11. The vector ܺ´ in equation 12 includes firm- and country-level controls. In line 
with existing studies we include firm-level controls such as a logarithm of a company’s profit, 
the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets, and cashflow in our estimation. 
We also control for inflation at the country level. In line with equation 11, μ௜ and ߜ௝௧ in equation 
12 are company and industry-year fixed effects respectively and ߝ௜௧ is an error term. 
Sub-sample analyses for firms belonging to IP-intensive or less IP-intensive groups shed light 
on the heterogeneity in potential for substituting two profit shifting channels for one another.  
According to Hypothesis 1, we expect that companies belonging to multinational groups with 
a high IP intensity rely more heavily on trade mispricing for profit shifting while other 
companies engage in profit shifting via intra-group debt if none of the profit shifting channels 
are restricted. Beer and Loeprick (2015) show that the profit shifting behavior of subsidiaries 
with high intangibles-to-total-assets ratios is less influenced by anti-avoidance legislation than 
the profit shifting behavior of affiliates with a low fraction of intangible assets. Against this 
background, we estimate the benchmark models presented in sections 5.1 and 5.2 for IP-
intensive and non-IP-intensive companies. We classify IP-intensive firms as those that belong 
to MNEs with an IP intensity above the mean of our sample,20 with IP intensity defined as the 
ratio of intangible assets to total fixed assets.21  
Since certain countries, such as Germany, do not allow the capitalization of self-created 
intangible assets, we additionally assign all companies active in R&D-intensive industries to 
the subsample of IP-intensive firms. We define R&D-intensive industries based on the 
                                                            
20 We refer to the IP intensity of a group, because the opportunity to shift profits via royalty payments does not 
depend on the company’s own level of IP intensity but rather on the existence of valuable intangible assets at the 
level of any of the group’s affiliates. 
21 We test alternative definitions of IP intensity in the robustness checks. 
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Stifterverband report,22 which shows the aggregate internal R&D investments per industry in 
2008. Hence, we classify all industries that invested more than one billion EUR in R&D in 2008 
as R&D-intensive. This includes the following sectors: 
 Manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products; 
 Manufacturing of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations; 
 Manufacturing of computers, electronics, and optical products; 
 Manufacturing of electrical equipment; 
 Manufacturing of machinery and equipment; 
 Manufacturing of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers; 
 Manufacturing of air and spacecraft; 
 Information and communication; 
 Scientific research and development. 
5.2 Quasi-Experimental Analysis of a French Tax Reform 
The estimation approach presented in the previous section relies on firms’ reactions to a 
variation of relevant tax parameters over time and a correct classification of anti-avoidance 
strictness. A common concern of studies using this approach is that the detected results are 
potentially prone to confounding effects that are not controlled for in the regression analysis. 
Hence, to complement the identification of the interdependence between profit shifting 
strategies and further validate our findings from the panel analysis, we exploit a quasi-
experimental reform setting in France using a difference-in-difference approach. Besides the 
comparison to a control group, one additional advantage of this approach is that we do not have 
to model the strictness of thin capitalization and transfer pricing rules. In the difference-in-
difference design, we compare the average changes in EBIT for firms experiencing an increase 
in the strictness of thin capitalization rules with those not affected by the reform in 2007. Both 
the corporate income tax rate and the strictness of transfer pricing regulations remained 
unchanged in France during the years considered in our analysis. In addition, we are not aware 
of any other reforms that might have had different effects on the treatment and control groups.  
The French tax reform of 2007 expanded the application of French thin capitalization rules to 
related parties within the European Union (EU). The preceding regulation, stipulating a 
restriction on interest payments to controlling shareholders, was changed in 2004 due to EU 
                                                            
22 See Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2013). 
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case law (European Court of Justice, 2002) and since then (until the 2007 reform) was no longer 
applicable to interest payments made to controlling shareholders resident in the EU and those 
resident in specific tax treaty countries. The Finance Act of 200623 has introduced new interest 
deduction restrictions for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2007. These rules applied 
to related parties regardless of their residence and covered interest transactions to parent 
companies and to other associated firms. Associated companies are defined as two companies 
in which one holds directly or indirectly a minimum of 50% of the other firm’s capital or as 
two companies in which a third enterprise holds directly or indirectly 50% of their capital. The 
strictness of the new thin capitalization rule was now defined by two thresholds: a debt-to-
equity ratio of 1.5:1 (as before 2007) and in addition a limitation of 25% of a company’s 
EBITDA. The interest that exceeds the higher of the two thresholds was considered non-
deductible for tax purposes. If the non-deductible interest was 150,000 EUR or less, all interest 
is considered deductible. According to these regulations, we classify a firm as belonging to the 
treatment group if it faced unrestricted debt shifting opportunities prior to the reform and 
became subject to interest deduction restrictions from 2007 onwards. This is the case if three 
conditions are met: (1) Its parent company is located in one of the countries covered by the 
exemption of thin capitalization rules between 2004 and 2006 (EU member states or certain 
treaty-exempted countries). (2) Its reported median interest payments in the three years prior to 
the reform exceed 150,000 EUR (since this amount of interest remained deductible after the 
reform irrespective of a company’s debt-to-equity ratio). (3) It faces a higher tax rate than its 
parent firm since otherwise no tax incentive for high debt levels would be present (Graham, 
2013). Consequently, the control group includes companies with parent firms that reside in 
countries covered by thin capitalization rules before 2007 as well as companies without a tax 
incentive and firms with low interest payments. 
We use the following difference-in-difference specification to study the impact of the 2007 
reform: 
																							ܮ݋݃ሺܧܤܫܶሻ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ ൅	ߚଶܣ݂ݐ݁ݎ௧ ൅	ߚଷܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ ∗ ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎ௧ +													ሺ13ሻ 
																	൅	ߚସ	ܺ´௜௧ ൅ μ௜ ൅ ߜ௝௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧																																													 
In equation 13, Log(EBIT) is the dependent variable that denotes a natural logarithm of a firm’s 
i earnings before interest and taxes in year t. Treat is a binary variable that is equal to one for 
                                                            
23 See Ernst & Young (2008). 
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all firms that are assigned to the treatment group and is set to zero for all companies assigned 
to the control group. The variable After equals zero for pre-reform years between 2004 and 
2006 and takes on the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009.  
The coefficient of interest in equation 13 is ߚଷ. The identifying assumption is that in the absence 
of a reform the dependent variable would have followed a similar trend in both treatment and 
control groups. Since treated firms face a higher cost of shifting profits via interest payments, 
they are expected to rely more on trade mispricing upon policy intervention if they have some 
discretionary leeway of doing so. Consequently, we expect ߚଷ to be negative. This would 
suggest that firms affected by the reform are more likely to reduce their EBIT than the 
unaffected companies. ܺ´	in equation 13 comprises firm-level controls such as fixed assets and 
the employee costs. In addition, equation 13 contains industry-year fixed effects ߜ௝௧ and 
company fixed effects μ௜. ߝ௜௧ is an error term. 
6  Results  
6.1 Results 1: Panel data estimation of the interaction between thin capitalization and 
transfer pricing 
This part of the paper refers to the research design and the regression equation described in 
Section 5.1.1. Table 1, Column I displays a negative and statistically significant tax sensitivity 
of reported EBIT. With all other factors remaining constant, on average a one percentage point 
increase in the tax rate leads to a -0.35% decrease in a company’s reported profits. This negative 
relationship has already been presented in the earlier literature on profit shifting (see the meta-
study of Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) for an overview). The effect size is, however, 
somewhat smaller than the average effect size derived in this meta-study. 
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Table 1. Regression Results: Log(EBIT) as a Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample IP Non-IP 
 I II III VI 
CIT -0.351*** -0.013 -0.857*** 0.559* 
 (0.107) (0.194) (0.260) (0.307) 
TP 0.020*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
CIT x TP 0.103*** 0.517*** 0.521*** 0.551*** 
 (0.024) (0.079) (0.107) (0.123) 
TC  0.027*** 0.010 0.043*** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
CIT x TC  -0.358*** -0.014 -0.473*** 
  (0.109) (0.148) (0.168) 
TP x TC  -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.027*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
CIT x TP x TC  -0.228*** -0.278*** -0.206*** 
  (0.044) (0.060) (0.069) 
Log(Fixed Assets) 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.084*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(Costs of Empl.) 0.395*** 0.393*** 0.398*** 0.380*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Unemployment Rate -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption 0.000 -0.002 0.004 0.000 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.029) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(GDP) 0.432** -0.109 0.484* -0.773** 
 (0.189) (0.207) (0.285) (0.319) 
Log(GDP/capita) -0.268 0.349* -0.141 0.914*** 
 (0.174) (0.195) (0.276) (0.292) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 103,714 103,714 66,331 51,877 
No. of Observations 541,323 541,323 321,842 218,319 
R2 (within) 0.087 0.087 0.086 0.085 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. Dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural logarithm 
of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures the strictness 
of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. Log(Fixed Assets) and 
Log(Cost of Empl.) are firm-level controls and represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and 
employee costs respectively. Unemployment Rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. Corruption 
represents a corruption index. GDP Growth Rate is a country’s rate of GDP growth. Log(GDP) denotes a natural 
logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. Log(GDP/capita) stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s 
GDP per capita. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms as defined in section 5.3 
and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
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Table 1, Column II reinvestigates the influence of transfer pricing regulations on a firm’s profits. 
Consistent with Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Lohse and Riedel (2013), Saunders-Scott 
(2013), and Beer and Loeprick (2015), we find that an implementation of transfer pricing 
documentation rules in high-tax countries leads to an increase in firms’ reported earnings before 
interest and taxes (Table 1, Column II). The coefficient on the interaction term between the 
corporate income tax rate and the transfer pricing rules is positive and statistically significant. 
It indicates that on average the negative tax rate sensitivity of EBIT shrinks by 0.1 percentage 
points every additional year that the transfer pricing regulation is in place. The effect size is 
comparable to the one reported by Beer and Loeprick (2015) who use the same measure for the 
strictness of transfer pricing regulations. This suggest a high effectiveness of strict transfer 
pricing regulations in limiting profit shifting behavior as put forward by Lohse and Riedel 
(2012) and Beer and Loeprick (2015). However, by not taking into account the possibility that 
firms might substitute profit shifting via debt for profit shifting via transfer pricing, the 
measured effect could be misleading in a tax policy context. 
To test our hypotheses on potential substitution effects, we augment the regression by an 
indicator for interest deduction limitation rules as defined in Section 4.2 (Table I, Column III). 
In addition, to account for conditional effects, pairwise interactions and an interaction term 
between all three variables of interest are also included. In the presence of the triple interaction, 
the two-way interaction between the transfer pricing rules and CIT reflects the case where only 
formal transfer pricing rules exist, whereas interest deduction limitations do not. The coefficient 
on two-way interaction is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that in the 
absence of thin capitalization rules companies in high-tax countries seem to shift smaller 
volumes via the transfer pricing channel if transfer pricing rules exist. This confirms H 2a. Since 
this effect could include an absolute reduction in profit shifting activity, as well as a substitution 
with debt financing, we test whether the effect is mirrored in the debt equation. Table 2 
illustrates the results for the corresponding debt regression as described in Section 5.1. The 
interaction between CIT and TP (Table 2 Column I) with debt ratio as a dependent variable 
illustrates the impact of transfer pricing regulations on the tax rate elasticity of the debt ratio. It 
is positive and significant at the 10% level. We conclude that the reduction of the tax rate 
sensitivity of EBIT following the introduction of transfer pricing regulations is accompanied 
by an increase in the debt ratio. We take this as an indication that firms to some extent substitute 
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debt shifting for transfer pricing shifting if the latter channel is restricted while the debt channel 
is not.  
Table 2. Regression Results: Debt Ratio as a Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample IP Non-IP 
 I II III 
CIT 0.209*** 0.197*** 0.225*** 
 (0.039) (0.054) (0.059) 
TP Doc 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CITxTP Doc 0.027* 0.037* 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.023) 
TC Rule 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
CITxTC Rule -0.034 -0.024 -0.058* 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.035) 
TP DocxTC Rule -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
CITxTP DocxTC Rule -0.017* -0.022* -0.012 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) 
Log Profits -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Tangible Assets/Total 
Assets 
-0.021*** -0.016** -0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
Log Cashflow -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes 
# Companies 62,032 41,617 27,248 
# Observations 249,137 158,947 89,740 
R-squared (within) 0.016 0.017 0.020 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is DebtRatio, which is loans to total assets. 
CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures 
the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. Firm-level controls include Log(Profits), Log(Cashflow), and a 
ratio of fixed tangible assets to total assets. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms 
as defined in section 5.3 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
 
To investigate potential substitutive behavior in the other direction (from debt shifting to 
transfer pricing shifting), Table 1, Column III also includes an  interaction term between the 
corporate income tax rate (CIT) and the indicator for interest deduction limitations (TC) with 
log(EBIT) as the dependent variable. This reflects the case where only interest deduction 
restrictions exist but transfer pricing documentation rules do not apply.  
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The coefficient on these restrictions is negative and statistically significant which suggests that, 
in the absence of strict transfer pricing documentation rules, strict interest deduction restrictions 
lead to a further decrease in the negative tax sensitivity of EBIT by on average 0.36 percentage 
points, with each increase in the three-stage indicator for interest deduction restrictions. Since 
EBIT does not include interest payments, no technical relationship between thin capitalization 
and EBIT exists and we take the significant effect as an indication that firms substitute transfer 
pricing shifting for debt shifting if the latter is restricted. To substantiate this finding, Table 2, 
Column I shows the respective response to tighter thin capitalization rules as reflected in the 
tax rate sensitivity of the debt ratio. As expected, we find a negative sign, indicating a reduction 
of the debt ratio. The effect, however, is not significant in the full specification. If we later look 
at the subsample analysis, however, we observe a negative and significant response for firms 
with a low intangible intensity. It is plausible to assume that these firms relied more heavily on 
debt shifting prior to the reform (H1) and are thus greatly affected by the strengthening of thin 
capitalization rules.  
Turning again to the EBIT specification (Table 1), the triple interaction of the CIT rate with the 
transfer pricing indicator and the interest deduction limitation indicator depicts the conditional 
reform effect if both profit shifting channels are restricted. It is also negative and highly 
significant (-0.228). This suggests that the positive impact determined for transfer pricing rules 
on the tax rate elasticity of EBIT (0.517) is much less pronounced if thin capitalization rules 
are strict. We consider this to be suggestive evidence that the initial effect measured for the 
introduction of transfer pricing regulations in absence of thin capitalization rules includes both 
a reduction in profit shifting behavior and a substitution of transfer pricing shifting with debt 
shifting. To give an example, three years after the introduction of formal transfer pricing 
documentation rules, the average marginal effect yields a tax rate sensitivity of -0.54 when the 
debt channel is restricted as opposed to 1.53 when substitution with debt shifting is possible 
because no restriction is imposed on that channel. 
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Figure 1. Average Marginal Effects of CIT on Log (EBIT): Full Sample 
 
Hence, estimating the conditional effect helps to disentangle the impact of both decision 
margins (reducing profit shifting and substituting between channels). The overall tax rate 
elasticity of EBIT tests negative and increases only slightly with increasing strictness of transfer 
pricing regulations (Figure 1). It turns insignificant when transfer pricing regulations have been 
in place for seven years or more. This confirms hypothesis H3a, which stated that firms to some 
extent continue to substitute transfer pricing shifting for debt shifting if thin capitalization rules 
are strengthened and transfer pricing rules are strict as well. We further substantiate this finding 
by looking at the interactions in the debt equation.  (Table 2, Column I) We observe that the 
positive impact of transfer pricing regulations on the tax sensitivity of the debt ratio determined 
for the case of an unrestricted debt channel (signaling substitution of transfer pricing shifting 
for debt shifting) is substantially mitigated if the debt channel is restricted (i.e. no substitution 
with debt shifting is further possible). This observation exactly mirrors the effect shown for the 
transfer pricing channel above. 
Subsample analysis for different IP intensities 
According to hypotheses H1 and H3b firms differ in terms of their scope to exploit leeways in 
trade mispricing. To test these hypotheses, we split the baseline sample into IP-intensive and 
non-IP-intensive companies. In line with Hypothesis 1, columns III and IV of Table 1 show 
that IP-intensive firms shift profits via transfer pricing manipulation in the absence of any anti-
avoidance regulations. For this subgroup, we find a negative tax rate sensitivity of EBIT. For 
companies with a low IP intensity, an increase in the tax rate even has a weakly positive effect 
on EBIT. The results indicate that non-IP-intensive companies on average do not engage in 
profit shifting via transfer prices if both channels are unrestricted. Once strict interest deduction 
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limitation rules are in place, however, the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction 
term CITxTC reveals that non-IP-intensive firms now choose transfer pricing as their main 
profit shifting strategy (Table 1, Column V). The debt equation again mirrors this effect (Table 
2, Column III): we observe a significant reduction of the tax rate sensitivity of the debt ratio 
following the introduction of interest deduction restrictions. Both results speak in favor of 
hypothesis H2b, namely that firms substitute shifting via the unrestricted channel for shifting 
via the restricted channel.  
We also find support for this substitution hypothesis in the sample of firms with high IP 
intensity (Table 1, Column IV). If transfer pricing regulations become stricter, we observe a 
positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term CITxTP which confirms the 
expected reduction of profit shifting via this channel. In return, we learn from the debt equation 
that this subsample on average reports higher debt ratios when transfer pricing regulations are 
tightened (Table 2, Column II). Again, we conclude that firms react to the increase in channel 
specific shifting costs by switching to some extent to another profit shifting strategy (H2b).     
Figure 2. Average Marginal Effects of CIT on Log (EBIT): IP-Intensive Firms 
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Figure 3. Average Marginal Effects of CIT on Log(EBIT): Non-IP-Intensive Firms 
 
According to columns III and IV of Table 1, the coefficient on triple interaction is negative for 
both subsamples. Looking at the average marginal effects (Figures 2 and 3), we find that for 
IP-intensive firms the negative tax rate sensitivity given strict interest deduction restrictions is 
statistically significant for all levels up to seven years after the introduction of transfer pricing 
documentation rules (Figure 2). For non-IP-intensive firms, the negative tax rate sensitivity is 
only statistically significant in the first four years after transfer pricing documentation rules 
have been introduced if strict interest deduction restrictions exist (Figure 3). The size of the 
coefficient and its statistical significance declines with each additional year of the existence of 
transfer pricing documentation rules. These findings confirm our expectation from hypothesis 
H3b that, in a setting where both channels are restricted, IP-intensive firms have a wider scope 
for profit shifting via transfer pricing.  
6.1.3 Robustness Tests 
We conduct several robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our findings. Firstly, we replace 
the indicators for anti-avoidance rules with alternative measures (Table 3). Following Buettner 
et al. (2012), we use a non-linear transformation of the debt-to-equity ratio as an alternative 
indicator for interest deduction limitations (Table 3, Column I and II). If no thin capitalization 
rules exist, the indicator is equal to zero and in countries that apply an earnings stripping ratio 
this variable is set to missing.24 Furthermore, following Lohse and Riedel (2013) we use an 
alternative measure for the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. This is a binary variable, 
which equals one if formal transfer pricing documentation rules exist in a country and zero 
                                                            
24 Section 4.2 provides more details on the construction of this variable. 
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otherwise (Table 3, Column III and IV). Moreover, we additionally incorporate informal 
transfer pricing documentation rules using a variable that is set to one in all countries with an 
informal transfer pricing documentation requirement. We combine this measure with our main 
variable of interest to take into account the effect of time since implementation. Consequently, 
this variable increases by one each year after formal transfer pricing documentation rules have 
been introduced (Table 3, Column V and VI). 
If we use the level of the debt-to-equity ratio as an indicator for interest deduction limitations, 
the results for the estimations according to equation 11 remain comparable to our baseline 
findings. One major difference is that the interaction between the interest deduction restrictions 
and the corporate income tax rate in column II of Table 3 still remains negative for non-IP-
intensive firms but it is no longer statistically significant. While the interest deduction limitation 
strictness indicator underlying the baseline results considers both thin capitalization rules and 
earnings stripping rules, the indicator in the robustness check uses a transformation of the debt-
to-equity ratio and therefore excludes countries with earnings stripping rules. Hence, the more 
significant coefficient in the baseline analysis could be driven by considering earning stripping 
countries as well. The negative triple interaction can be confirmed.  
Using an alternative transfer pricing variable based on Lohse and Riedel (2013), most of our 
baseline results are confirmed. The only difference is that the tax rate sensitivity of IP-intensive 
firms is negative but no longer statistically significant once we use an alternative measure (see 
column III of Table 13). Moreover, the interaction between the tax rate and transfer pricing 
rules (in the regression with Log(EBIT) as a dependent variable) is no longer statistically 
significant for companies with a low IP intensity. However, these results have to be treated with 
caution, since the binary TP variable exhibits considerably less variation in our sample 
compared to our benchmark indicator for transfer pricing regulations. The transfer pricing 
variable which incorporates both informal transfer pricing documentation rules and the effect 
of time on the strictness of transfer pricing regulations (see columns V and VI of Table 13) 
shows no substantial difference compared to the baseline findings.  
In addition to using alternative definitions of the anti-avoidance regulations, we also apply 
alternative definitions of IP intensity (Table 4). In the first variant (Table 4, Column I and II), 
we split the sample by taking into account a group’s ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
Under this definition companies active in R&D-intensive industries are (contrary to our main 
regression results) not automatically assumed to be IP-intensive. In the second alternative 
(Table 4, Column III and IV), we define IP intensity based on the level of intangible assets held 
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by an affiliate instead of the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. In a third alternative (Table 
4, Column V and VI), we use the ratio of intangible assets to total fixed assets and additionally 
include all firms active in R&D-intensive industries in the sample of IP-intensive companies. 
The variations in the definition of IP intensity yield very similar results and confirm the baseline 
results presented in the main results section.  
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Table 3. Robustness Tests Using Alternative Definitions of Anti-Avoidance Legislation: 
Log(EBIT) as a Dependent Variable 
TP Measure: TP Doc Years TP Doc Binary 
TP Doc Years + TP 
Doc required in 
practice 
TC Measure: 
1 / (1 )  TC D/E Ratio TC 3-stage TC 3-stage 
 IP Non-IP IP Non-IP IP Non-IP 
 I II III IV V VI 
CIT -1.263*** 0.256 -0.418 0.907*** -0.853*** 0.572* 
 (0.290) (0.342) (0.255) (0.302) (0.264) (0.310) 
TP 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.000 0.000 0.045*** 0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.007) 
CITxTP 0.915*** 0.974*** 0.071*** 0.024 0.400*** 0.413*** 
 (0.122) (0.147) (0.013) (0.017) (0.085) (0.099) 
TC -0.042 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.020** 0.050*** 
 (0.100) (0.108) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.012) 
CITxTC 1.764 -1.622 0.532* 0.584* 0.002 -0.502*** 
 (1.194) (1.399) (0.273) (0.316) (0.151) (0.171) 
TPxTC -0.195*** -0.246*** 0.028*** 0.046*** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.010) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) 
CITxTPxTC -2.684*** -2.278*** 0.075 -0.361** -0.239*** -0.154*** 
 (0.402) (0.491) (0.152) (0.173) (0.048) (0.055) 
Log(Fixed Assets) 0.077*** 0.084*** 0.000 0.000 0.079*** 0.084*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(Costs of Empl.) 0.407*** 0.388*** -0.042*** -0.010 0.398*** 0.380*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Unemployment Rate -0.011*** -0.012*** 0.000 0.000 -0.013*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption 0.024 0.015 -0.818*** -0.584*** 0.009 0.002 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.177) (0.198) (0.022) (0.029) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(GDP) -0.682** -2.137*** 0.399*** 0.381*** 0.395 -0.827** 
 (0.324) (0.364) (0.009) (0.009) (0.286) (0.322) 
Log(GDP/capita) 0.932*** 2.055*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.087 0.933*** 
 (0.311) (0.331) (0.002) (0.002) (0.277) (0.297) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes 0.026 -0.015 Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes (0.022) (0.028) Yes Yes 
No. of Companies Yes Yes 0.007*** 0.005*** 66331 51877 
No. of Observations 63267 49437 (0.001) (0.002) 321842 218319 
R2 (within) 284982 195888 0.902*** 0.117 0.086 0.085 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures 
the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. 
Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Cost of Empl.) are firm-level controls and represent natural logarithms of a 
company’s fixed assets and employee costs respectively. Unemployment Rate stands for a country’s rate of 
unemployment. Corruption represents a corruption index. GDP Growth Rate is a country’s rate of GDP growth. 
Log(GDP) denotes a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. Log(GDP/capita) stands for a 
natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per capita. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-
intensive firms as defined in section 5.3 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
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Table 4. Robustness Tests Using Alternative Definitions of IP Intensity: Log(EBIT) as a 
Dependent Variable 
 IP2 Non-IP2 IP3 Non-IP3 IP4 Non-IP4 
 I II III IV V VI 
CIT -0.450* 0.353 -0.525* 0.046 -0.581** 0.647** 
 (0.270) (0.285) (0.274) (0.298) (0.261) (0.298) 
TP 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
CIT x TP 0.613*** 0.431*** 0.513*** 0.528*** 0.617*** 0.379*** 
 (0.108) (0.116) (0.112) (0.120) (0.107) (0.118) 
TC 0.007 0.044*** 0.011 0.044*** 0.008 0.043*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
CIT x TC -0.143 -0.531*** -0.044 -0.348** -0.073 -0.655*** 
 (0.152) (0.159) (0.154) (0.166) (0.148) (0.165) 
TP x TC -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
CIT x TP x TC -0.275*** -0.187*** -0.248*** -0.222*** -0.298*** -0.131* 
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.062) (0.068) (0.059) (0.068) 
Log(Fixed Assets) 0.090*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Log(Costs of Empl.) 0.399*** 0.387*** 0.405*** 0.375*** 0.401*** 0.382*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Unemployment Rate -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption 0.002 -0.005 -0.008 0.006 -0.014 0.022 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(GDP) 0.096 -0.288 0.292 -0.301 0.130 -0.275 
 (0.287) (0.300) (0.298) (0.316) (0.279) (0.311) 
Log(GDP/capita) 0.149 0.509* 0.016 0.507* 0.130 0.543* 
 (0.274) (0.278) (0.290) (0.288) (0.266) (0.287) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 52,985 50,728 66,842 68,459 60,389 43,324 
No. of Observations 284,806 256,515 278,859 261,107 323,655 217,666 
R2 (within) 0.093 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.093 0.081 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural logarithm 
of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP measures the strictness 
of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. Log(Fixed Assets) and 
Log(Cost of Empl.) are firm-level controls and represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and employee 
costs respectively. Unemployment Rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. Corruption represents a 
corruption index. GDP Growth Rate is a country’s rate of GDP growth. Log(GDP) denotes a natural logarithm of a 
country’s gross domestic product. Log(GDP/capita) stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per capita. 
FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms and Non-IP includes a sample of all other 
companies. 
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6.2 Results 2: Quasi-Experimental Analysis of a French Tax Reform 
6.2.1 Baseline Findings 
The empirical evidence presented in the previous section suggests that multinational enterprises 
are able to substitute profit shifting channels for one another. In order to validate this finding, 
we additionally study a reform setting in France using a difference-in-difference approach. As 
described in section 5.2, we divide the sample into treatment and control groups according to 
their level of exposure to the reform.  
Figure 4 shows that the average EBIT of treatment and control groups followed a parallel trend 
during the three years prior to the introduction of the reform in 2007. The parallel trend 
assumption required for a difference-in-difference setting is confirmed for both the full sample 
(Panel A) and the subsample of IP-intensive firms (Panel B). Moreover, it is already obvious 
from this descriptive representation, that the average reported profits experience a sharp decline 
for treated firms in the post reform year that we do not find in the control sample. 
Figure 4. Common Trend of EBIT in Treatment and Control Groups 
Panel A. Full Sample                                              Panel B. IP-Intensive Firms 
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Table 6 summarizes the results of the difference-in-difference estimation. Column I presents 
the difference-in-difference regression results with both industry-year and firm fixed effects but 
without controlling for firm-level time-variant variables which will be included in column II. 
The coefficient on the difference-in-difference estimator is negative and significant at the level 
of 1%. It remains negative and statistically significant once we add fixed assets and employee 
compensation to the benchmark specification (see column II). This finding confirms or 
substitution hypotheses 2b and 3a along with our previous results, suggesting that firms facing 
a restriction on profit shifting via the debt channel use profit shifting via transfer prices more 
extensively.  
In order to test the idea that treated firms differ in their potential use of transfer prices as a profit 
shifting strategy and therefore in their capacity to react to stricter thin capitalization rules by 
substituting their current strategy with transfer pricing shifting, we repeat the difference-in-
difference regression separately for IP-intensive and non-IP-intensive companies (as defined in 
Section 5.1).  
While France did not have formal transfer pricing documentation rules in the sample period 
2004-2009, it nevertheless had transfer pricing regulations in place which were fairly strictly 
enforced. This suggests that, for companies not affected by thin capitalization rules before 2007, 
shifting high levels of profits via the debt channel might have been cheaper than excessively 
using transfer pricing manipulation. Consequently, the model suggests that both companies 
with a high and low intensity of intangible assets in the treatment group had incentives to make 
use of debt shifting prior to the reform. This is also implicitly ensured only including companies 
in the treatment group with high levels of interest paid. Thus, restricting the level of allowed 
debt shifting through the introduction of thin capitalization rules affects firms in the treatment 
group irrespective of their level of intangible intensity. However, the potential for substitution 
with the other channel is likely to be more pronounced for companies with a high intangible 
intensity suggesting that these companies are more able to substitute debt shifting with shifting 
via transfer pricing.  
In fact, the results shown in columns III and IV of Table 6 indicate a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on the difference-in-difference estimator for IP-intensive companies and 
an insignificant coefficient for non-IP-intensive firms. This finding supports hypothesis H3b, 
according to which companies with a high IP intensity have more leeway in substituting debt 
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shifting with transfer pricing shifting. In order to validate these results, we conduct a triple 
difference-in-difference estimation instead of splitting the sample into two parts. This is carried 
out by including an indicator variable for the intangibles intensity IP in the benchmark model. 
The coefficient on the triple difference estimator appears to be statistically significant and 
negative. Furthermore, with an F-value of 6.41 the joint coefficient is also highly significant.  
Table 6. Main Results of Difference-In-Difference Estimation: Log(EBIT) as a Dependent 
Variable 
 Full Sample IP Non-IP Full  
 I II III IV V 
After 1.525 -0.868** -0.273*** -1.216** -0.891** 
 (0.966) (0.410) (0.053) (0.523) (0.405) 
Treat*After -0.367*** -0.314** -0.573*** -0.097 -0.066 
 (0.131) (0.126) (0.157) (0.164) (0.166) 
After*IP     0.056 
     (0.046) 
Treat*After*IP     -0.497** 
     (0.227) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 938 938 506 432 938 
No. of Observations 5,628 5,628 3,036 2,592 5,628 
R2 (within) 0.072 0.124 0.165 0.104 0.125 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. After is equal to zero for pre-reform years between 2004 
and 2006 and takes on the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009. Treat is a binary variable 
that is equal to one for all firms that are assigned to the treatment group and is equal to zero for all companies 
assigned to the control group. Controls includes Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Costs of Empl.), which represent 
natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and the employee costs respectively. FE stands for fixed effects. IP 
represents a sample of IP-intensive firms as defined in section 5.3 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other 
companies. 
6.2.2 Robustness Tests 
As a robustness test, we check whether our benchmark results remain the same once we define 
the treatment group differently. The corresponding estimation outcomes are shown in Table 7. 
We begin by assigning only companies that have a tax incentive and a parent firm in an EU 
Member State or a country with a required treaty to the treatment group. The additional 
requirement of interest payments above 150,000 EUR is ignored. We label this alternative 
treatment definition Treat2 (Table 7, Column I). As a second alternative, we refer to the mean 
instead of the median interest payments in the three years prior to the reform to determine 
whether companies fulfil the requirement of interest payments above the exempt amount 
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(Treat3). Finally, we classify all companies with a parent in the EU or a treaty-exempt country 
with interest above 150,000 EUR as the treatment group (Treat4) instead and limit the sample 
to companies with a tax incentive (i.e. also the control group consists of firms with a debt 
shifting tax incentive) (Table 7, Column 3). According to columns I-III of Table 7, the 
alternative definitions of the treatment group and the sample yield highly significant negative 
coefficients for the difference-in-difference estimator on EBIT and confirm our baseline 
analysis. Moreover, we conduct a placebo test, in which we assume that the reform was 
implemented in 2006 instead of 2007. According to column IV of Table 7, the results of a 
placebo test turn out to be statistically insignificant, which further supports the validity of our 
main findings.  
Table 7. Robustness Tests Using Alternative Definitions of Treatment and Control Groups as 
well as a Placebo Test: Log(EBIT) as a Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample 
 I II III IV 
After -0.866** -0.868** 0.060  
 (0.409) (0.410) (0.132)  
Treat2*After -0.104*    
 (0.057)    
Treat3*After   -0.308**   
  (0.120)   
Treat4*After   -0.315**  
   (0.135)  
After(Placebo)    -0.184 
    (0.574) 
Treat*After(Placebo)    -0.082 
    (0.133) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 1,040 938 204 938 
No. of Observations 6,240 5,628 1,224 3,752 
R2 (within) 0.115 0.124 0.115 0.158 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. After is equal to zero for pre-reform years between 2004 
and 2006 and takes on the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009. After(Placebo) is 
equal to zero for 2004 and 2005 and takes on the value of one for 2006 and 2007. Treat is a binary variable that 
is equal to one for all firms that are assigned to the treatment group and is set to zero for all companies assigned 
to the control group. Controls includes Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Costs of Empl.), which represent natural 
logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and employee costs respectively. FE stands for fixed effects. 
In line with the analysis presented in section 6.1.3, we test the findings of this part of the paper 
using two alternative definitions of IP intensity. According to Table 8, the results remain almost 
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unchanged once IP-intensive firms are defined differently. The coefficient on the difference-in-
difference estimator is negative and statistically significant in the case of IP-intensive firms, 
which demonstrates the robustness of our baseline findings. 
Table 8. Robustness Tests Using Different Definitions for IP Intensity: Log(EBIT) as a 
Dependent Variable 
 
IP: intangible assets/total assets 
of a group > median of all 
groups 
IP: intangible assets of a group 
> median of all groups 
 IP Non-IP IP Non-IP 
 I II III IV 
After 0.838*** 0.108*** 0.831*** 0.110** 
 (0.253) (0.040) (0.247) (0.046) 
Treat*After -0.563*** -0.126 -0.529*** -0.039 
 (0.170) (0.181) (0.177) (0.145) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Companies 427 385 434 378 
No. of Observations 2,562 2,310 2,604 2,268 
R2 (within) 0.192 0.118 0.197 0.122 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. After is equal to zero for pre-reform years between 2004 
and 2006 and takes on the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009. Treat is a binary 
variable that is equal to one for all firms that are assigned to the treatment group and is set to zero for all companies 
assigned to the control group. Controls includes Log(Fixed Assets) and Log(Costs of Empl.), which represent 
natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and employee costs respectively. FE stands for fixed effects. IP 
represents a sample of IP-intensive firms and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
7 Conclusion 
The issue of base erosion and profit shifting has been on the international policy agenda for 
several years now. The recent initiatives to fight BEPS are, however, not yet mirrored by a 
thorough understanding of how the introduction or the tightening of anti-avoidance legislation 
affects firms’ profit shifting strategies. Understanding the profit shifting mechanisms has a high 
relevance for understanding, explaining and predicting profit shifting behavior in a changing 
institutional environment (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001).  
Due to the nature of firm internal decision making processes that it is difficult to answer this 
question with archival data. Nonetheless, recent studies by, e.g. Hopland et al (2017), de Simone 
(2016), and Kim et al. (2015) show that specific research designs, reform settings and 
estimation techniques make it possible draw indirect inferences on the formation of profit 
strategies also from archival data.  
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Against this background, the objective of this paper was to further elucidate how profit shifting 
strategies are developed, in particular with respect to firms’ reaction to anti-avoidance 
legislation. Our main line of questioning was whether firms substitute different profit shifting 
strategies with one another if the channel specific costs change due to anti-avoidance 
legislation. This type of substitution could explain why studies looking at the effect of profit 
shifting strategies separately find evidence of a strong effectiveness of anti-avoidance 
legislation but little or no effect on investment responses.  
Our identification strategy includes two empirical approaches and focuses on the potential 
interdependency between transfer pricing shifting and debt shifting. Firstly, we use firm-level 
panel data from 2004 to 2012 on European companies from the Amadeus database. Secondly, 
we exploit a tax reform in France that came into force in 2007 as a quasi-experimental setting. 
This reform tightened thin capitalization rules for one group of French firms that had previously 
been exempt (in particular firms with European shareholders) while the regulations remained 
unchanged for the remaining French firms. In both approaches, we take into account that the 
potential to substitute, in particular, profit shifting via transfer prices for debt shifting depends 
on firms’ flexibility to deviate from arm’s length prices which is closely related to the 
specificity of intra-group transactions, i.e. the relevance of intangible assets (Dischinger and 
Riedel, 2011).  
Our results confirm existing evidence that tightening transfer pricing regulations reduces the 
tax sensitivity of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) substantially. Our results show, 
however, that this reduction includes both a reduction in profit shifting activity and a 
substitution with debt shifting. Moreover, we find that firms using debt shifting rely more 
heavily on tax optimization of transfer prices when thin capitalization rules are strengthened. If 
transfer pricing regulations are also strict, the conditional reform effects show that the 
substitutive response is more pronounced for a subsample of firms with a high share of 
intangible property (IP). The difference-in-difference approach for the French tax reform 
illustrates an increase in profit shifting based on transfer prices for treated firmsfacing new 
restriction on debt shifting. Again, the effect is stronger for IP intensive firms. 
As for policy recommendations, our results show that disregarding the conditional effect might 
provide biased conclusions about the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations and interest 
deduction restrictions. Taking into account that firms jointly optimize profit shifting strategies 
for both channels and therefore substitute between channels if the respective costs change might 
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also explain why it is difficult to empirically establish negative side effects of anti-avoidance 
rules.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Country Statistics 
  Full Sample IP  Non-IP  
Country Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % 
Austria 9,017 1.67 6,129 1.88 2,888 1.34 
Belgium 24,799 4.58 12,040 3.70 12,759 5.91 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1,177 0.22 634 0.19 543 0.25 
Bulgaria 3,625 0.67 1,882 0.58 1,743 0.81 
Croatia 5,525 1.02 3,044 0.94 2,481 1.15 
Czech Republic 22,997 4.25 12,333 3.79 10,664 4.94 
Denmark 10,766 1.99 4,956 1.52 5,810 2.69 
Estonia 4,502 0.83 1,841 0.57 2,661 1.23 
Finland 11,011 2.03 7,089 2.18 3,922 1.82 
France 99,863 18.45 70,775 21.74 29,088 13.48 
Germany 35,339 6.53 24,395 7.49 10,944 5.07 
Hungary 2,850 0.53 1,938 0.60 912 0.42 
Iceland 106 0.02 37 0.01 69 0.03 
Ireland 581 0.11 229 0.07 352 0.16 
Italy 54,878 10.14 45,782 14.07 9,096 4.21 
Latvia 102 0.02 57 0.02 45 0.02 
Luxembourg 2,160 0.40 1,112 0.34 1,048 0.49 
Malta 6 0.00 5 0.00 1 0.00 
Montenegro 15 0.00 9 0.00 6 0.00 
Netherlands 8,437 1.56 3,456 1.06 4,981 2.31 
Norway 21,620 3.99 15,117 4.64 6,503 3.01 
Poland 20,952 3.87 11,751 3.61 9,201 4.26 
Portugal 9,086 1.68 4,686 1.44 4,400 2.04 
Romania 20,764 3.84 10,595 3.26 10,169 4.71 
Serbia 6,248 1.15 2,909 0.89 3,339 1.55 
Slovak Republic 5,675 1.05 3,311 1.02 2,364 1.10 
Slovenia 3,310 0.61 2,298 0.71 1,012 0.47 
Spain 55,495 10.25 34,309 10.54 21,186 9.82 
Sweden 24,177 4.47 9,515 2.92 14,662 6.79 
Switzerland 15 0.00 7 0.00 6 0.00 
Ukraine 7,084 1.31 2,552 0.78 4,532 2.10 
UK 69,141 12.77 30,701 9.43 38,440 17.81 
Total 541,323 100 325,494 100 215,827 100 
Notes: This table shows a distribution of observations across countries in the full sample, as well as the sample of IP-
intensive firms, and the sample of non-IP firms. IP intensity is defined in section 5.3. 
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Table A2. An Overview of Transfer Pricing Documentation Requirements 
Country Formal Informal  
Austria No All Sample Years 
Belgium No All Sample Years 
Bosnia-Herzegovina No Since 2008 
Bulgaria No Since 2006 
Croatia Since 2005 
Czech Republic No All Sample Years 
Denmark Since 2006 All Sample Years 
Estonia Since 2007 
Finland Since 2007 All Sample Years 
France Since 2010 All Sample Years 
Germany Since 2003 All Sample Years 
Hungary Since 2010 All Sample Years 
Iceland No 
Ireland Since 2011 
Italy Since 2010 All Sample Years 
Latvia No Since 2007 
Luxembourg No Since 2005 
Malta No  
Montenegro No All Sample Years 
Netherlands Since 2002  
Norway Since 2008 All Sample Years 
Poland Since 2001  
Portugal Since 2002  
Romania Since 2007 All Sample Years 
Serbia No All Sample Years 
Slovak Republic Since 2009 All Sample Years 
Slovenia Since 2005  
Spain Since 2009 All Sample Years 
Sweden Since 2007 All Sample Years 
Switzerland No All Sample Years 
Ukraine No  
UK Since 2008 All Sample Years 
Notes: Formal refers to transfer pricing documentation requirements that are explicitly stated 
in national law. Informal refers to transfer pricing documentation requirements that are not 
explicitly mentioned in national law but are required in practice. 
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Table A3. An Overview of Debt-To-Equity Ratios under Thin Capitalization Rules 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Belgium  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Bulgaria 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Croatia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Czech Republic 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 
Denmark  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
France 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Germany 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 - - - - - 
Hungary 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Italy 5 4 4 4 - - - - - 
Latvia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Lithuania 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 
Netherlands 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Poland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Portugal 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Romania 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Serbia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Slovenia 0 8 8 8 6 6 6 5 4 
Spain 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 
Table.A4. Special Requirements Regarding Interest Deduction Limitations 
Country Rules 
Belgium 7:1 debt-to-equity ratio if interest is tax-exempt or taxed at a reduced rate at the level 
of a lender. 
France 2004-2006: applicable only to payments to non-EU parent companies that are not 
resident in one of the treaty-exempted countries. 
Luxembourg 85:15 debt-to-equity ratio if debt is used for the funding of participations or real estate 
located in Luxembourg. 
Portugal  2006-2012: applicable only to payments to non-EU parent companies. Before: an 
exemption is possible if debt-to-equity ratio is considered to be at arm’s length. 
Spain 2004-2011: applicable only to payments to non-EU parent companies. 
Sweden No deduction of interest paid on intra-group debt relating to the intra-group acquisition 
of shares if there are no justifying business or commercial reasons and the income is 
not subject to tax of at least 10%. 
Ukraine Interest deductible up to a firm’s own interest income and 50% of other income if paid 
to a foreign company. 
UK Included in transfer pricing regulations; generally a 1:1 ratio is used as a guideline. 
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Table A5. Three-Stage Indicator of Interest Deduction Restrictions 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Croatia 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Germany 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Latvia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Romania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Serbia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Notes: The three-stage variable measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. It is denoted as follows: 0: no 
specific interest deduction restrictions; 1: a special rule or a thin capitalization rule with broad exceptions or debt-to-
equity ratio above 3; 2: thin capitalization rules without broad exception and debt-to-equity ratio of 3 or lower or earnings 
stripping rules. 
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Table A6. Descriptive Statistics: Panel-Data Analysis 
 Full Sample IP  Non-IP  
 Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max 
EBIT 541,323 4,605.62 0.00 9,535,506 325,494 5,127.08 0.00 6,219,053 215,829 3,819.23 0.00 9,535,506 
Fixed Assets 541,323 25,631.88 0.00 5.06E+07 325,494 28,875.49 0.00 5.06E+07 215,829 20,740.31 0.00 3.52E+07 
Costs of Empl. 541,323 7,689.78 0.00 7,336,624 325,494 8,792.55 0.00 7,336,624 215,829 6,026.75 0.00 6,041,358 
    
Interest Paid 375,573 1,480.30 0.00 1.94E+08 238,004 1,755.68 0.00 1.94E+08 137,569 1,003.81 0.00 6,567,206 
Sales 375,573 78,082.02 0.00 1.15E+08 238,004 80,777.43 0.00 5.00E+07 137,569 73,418.77 0.00 1.15E+08 
Net PPE/Assets 375,573 0.18 0.00 79.64 238,004 0.17 0.00 79.64 137,569 0.19 0.00 1.96 
EBITDA/Assets 375,573 0.17 0.00 585.70 238,004 0.16 0.00 329.39 137,569 0.16 0 585.70 
    
Intangibles 541,323 2,665.22 0.00 1.80E+07 325,494 3,722.45 0.00 1.80E+07 215,829 1,055.35 0.00 3,762,855 
Intangibles/Assets  541,323 0.01 0.00 0.99 325,494 0.02 0.00 0.99 215,829 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
CIT 541,323 0.29 0.09 0.40 325,494 0.30 0.09 0.40 215,829 0.28 0.09 0.40 
TP Doc Years 541,323 1.53 0.00 11.00 325,494 1.46 0.00 11.00 215,829 1.63 0.00 11.00 
TP Doc Binary 541,323 0.49 0.00 1.00 325,494 0.49 0.00 1.00 215,829 0.51 0.00 1.00 
TP Doc Years +  
Doc Required in Practice 541,323 2.51 0.00 12.00 325,494 2.45 0.00 12.00 215,829 2.6 0.00 12.00 
TC 3-stage 541,323 1.24 0.00 2.00 325,494 1.28 0.00 2.00 215,829 1.18 0.00 2.00 
TC 1/ (1+ σ) 375,573 0.18 0.00 0.50 238,004 0.21 0.00 0.50 137,569 0.16 0.00 0.50 
    
Corruption 541,323 1.18 -1.03 2.56 325,494 1.15 -1.03 2.56 215,829 1.23 -1.03 2.56 
Unemployment Rate 541,323 8.57 2.30 31.80 325,494 8.63 2.30 31.80 215,829 8.45 2.30 31.80 
Inflation 541,323 2.74 -1.71 25.20 325,494 2.61 -1.71 25.20 215,829 2.94 -1.71 25.20 
GDP 541,323 1.09E+12 1.81E+09 2.55E+12 325,494 1.15E+12 2.18E+09 2.55E+12 215,829 9.88E+11 1.81E+09 2.55E+12 
GDP/capita 541,323 25,751.01 1421.18 70,569.24 325,494 26,021.74 1,421.18 70,569.24 215,829 25,342.54 1,421.18 70,569.24 
GDP Growth Rate 541,323 1.47 -14.80 12.10 325,494 1.37 -14.80 12.10 215,829 1.63 -14.80 12.10 
Growth Options 375,573 0.06 -0.99 140.86 238,004 0.06 -0.99 140.86 137,569 0.06 -0.99 23.57 
Notes: The number of observations is 541,323 in the regressions with Log(EBIT) as a dependent variable (see section 6.1.1) and 375,573 in the regressions with Log(Interest Paid) as a 
dependent variable (see section 6.1.2). EBIT denotes earnings before interest and taxes. Fixed Assets represents total fixed assets. Cost of Empl. stands for employee costs. Interest Paid 
denotes a firm’s interest payments. Sales stands for a company’s total turnover. Net PPE/Assets is a ratio of a company’s net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. EBITDA/Assets 
is a ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Intangibles shows total intangible assets of a company. Intangibles/Assets represents a ratio? of the 
MNE’s intangibles to total assets. CIT stands for a corporate income tax rate. TP-variables measure the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC-variables measure the strictness of interest 
deduction limitations. Corruption represents a corruption index. Unemployment Rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. Inflation denotes a country’s rate of inflation. GDP denotes 
a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. GDP/capita stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per capita. GDP Growth Rate is a country’s rate of GDP growth. 
Growth Options denotes the median annual sales growth per industry and country. IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms as defined in section 5.3 and Non-IP includes a sample of all 
other companies.
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Table A/. Descriptive Statistics: Difference-In-Difference Estimation 
Panel A. Full Sample 
 Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Treatment Group       
EBIT 120 8,377.94 3,373.41 11,857.69 156.30 53,744.78 
Costs of Empl. 120 15,506.77 9,793.83 20,690.72 851.26 110,785 
Fixed Assets 120 55,012 11,621.67 136,975.80 78.09 704,268.70
   
Control Group       
EBIT 5,508 11,893.03 718.48 106,761.80 0.19 3,232,000 
Costs of Empl. 5,508 16,833.22 2,011.11 73,509.92 0.33 1,769,000 
Fixed Assets 5,508 39,757.99 1,007.44 265,506.80 0.00 4,920,454 
   
All Firms       
EBIT 5,628 11,818.08 745.51 105,632.60 0.19 3,232,000 
Costs of Empl. 5,628 16,804.94 2,075.49 72,784.34 0.33 1,769,000 
Fixed Assets 5,628 40,083.24 1,039.74 263,423.90 0.00 4,920,454 
   
Panel B. IP-Intensive Firms 
     
 Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Treatment Group       
EBIT 60 10,025.57 4,050.25 13,793.34 209.69 53,744.78 
Costs of Empl. 60 21,617.45 11,612.07 26,851.96 851.26 110,785 
Fixed Assets 60 81,250.91 16,460.96 186,250.40 321.64 704,268.70
   
Control Group       
EBIT 2,976 15,668.66 1,274.36 135,135.90 0.50 3,232,000 
Costs of Empl. 2,976 21,241.59 3,739.15 59,276.42 2.78 641,069 
Fixed Assets 2,976 56,932.31 2,097.93 332,521.40 0.00 4,920,454 
   
All Firms       
EBIT 3,036 15,557.14 1,337.52 133,809.60 0.50 3,232,000 
Costs of Empl. 3,036 21,249.02 3,869.67 58,806.89 2.78 641,069 
Fixed Assets 3,036 57,412.92 2,166.21 330,258.10 0.00 4,920,454 
Notes: EBIT stands for earnings before interest and taxes. Cost of Empl. stands for employee costs. Fixed Assets 
represents total fixed assets. IP-intensive firms are defined in section 5.3
 
 
 
 
